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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ESTHER B. KING
Plaintiff arnd Resvondent,

vs.

Case No.

LA WRENC:F~ M. KING,
Defendant and Appellant.

12056

AP·P·ELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant, appellant, husband, seeks reduction or
termination of alimony o bliga ti on.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's motion for reduction or termination of
alimony obligation ·was den~d.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reYersal of the order denying modification of Decree.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, respondent, wife, filed a Complaint for
divorce on September 29, 1965, alleging that the parties
had no children and that they were married August 8,
1949, giving them a marriage of 16 years. (Rl-4).
Pursuant to motion made by plaintiff's attorney, an
order was entered allowing shortening of time and the
divorce was entered October 13, 1965. (R6)
Defendant, appellant, husband, did not appeal the
original decree.
The marriage was plaintiff's third, entered into
,,·hen she was 37 years of age. (R60, P25, L4-5; P48,
L7-8).
The sole ground for the divorce in the pleadings,
(Rl-4), findings, (R12, iT4), and testimony, (R42, P4,
L20-P5, LIO), was that defendant in the last two to three
years of marriage failed to associate with plaintiff, causing her great nervousness and distress.
The Findings of Fact for the Decree provide, (Rl3,
iT9), ''Plaintiff is under a doctor's care for a nervous
condition and is unable at the present time to secure or
hold employment, and that it is reasonable and proper
that defendant pay alimony to plaintiff for her support
and care in the amount of $250.00 per month," (R13, iT9).
Testimony given as a basis for a decree failed to consider the distribution of property between the parties.
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For example, plaintiff was awarded the home of the parties on her testimony that she made the original down
payment of $3,000.00 and was willing to assume the mortgage. (R60, P5, L14-P6, Lll). No other figures were
given to, nor asked by the trial court, at all, such as the
·rnlue of the parties assets, or the total or monthly outgo,
on debts defendant was required to pay. The exception
·was that they were required to split the bonds, but these
only totaled $50.00. (R17, iT3).
The decree of divorce split the property as follows,
such evidence being established at the hearing on defendant's motion to modify the alimony award, heard July 11,
1969: Plaintiff received the home of the parties situated
at 2863 South Holbrook Road, Bountiful, Utah. During
the marriage plaintiff worked intermittently, mainly during strikes of defendant who was employed by Kennecott
Copper. (R60, P34, L25-P35, L5; P66, L6-9). Defendant
worked steadily except for union ordered strikes. (R60,
P26, LG-10). Accordingly, other than plaintiff's initial
investment of $3,000.00, defendant made substantially
all of the contributions to the home, and provided for
plaintiff and her child by one of her prior marriages. At
the time of the divorce defendant valued the home at
$18,500.00 market value (R60, P32, Ll0-15), with a mortgage thereon of $4,500.00. (R60, P31, L26-29). Plaintiff
testified that the home value then was $17,500.00, (R60,
P57, Ll8-22), and $5,000.00 was owed. (R60, P57, Lll14). Under plaintiff's statement of facts, she received
an equity of $12,500.00. Under defendant's statement of
facts, she received an equity of $14,000.00 She also re3
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ceived the household furnishings. These were valued hy
defendant at $3,500.00, (R61, Def. Ex. 2). This evidence
was not controverted. Other than the mortgage on the
home which plaintiff assumed, defendant received the
obligations of the parties in the sum of $3,617.42. (R61,
Def. Ex. 2). He also received his personal effects and a
pickup truck which was subject to a $2,900.00 obligation.
(R60, P31, Ll6-19).
To .July 5, 1969, defendant had paid plaintiff $10,025.00 as alimony. (R61, Def. Ex. 2; R60, P29, L26-29).
Barring the nine month Kennecott Strike of 1967, he has
faithfully made full payment. Since the strike he has
even paid $15.00 per month to catch up the strike causc>d
arrearages. (R60, P31, L5-8, L19-20).
The award of alimony was apparently entered on the
premise the plaintiff was unemployable due to a nervous
condition which caused her hospitalization and psychiatric treatment. After the hearing, plaintiff was promptly
released from the hospital. She has held three jobs since,
quit them all of her own volition, and without difficulty
with other employees. (R60, P62, Ll9--P63, L4; P67,
L6-27). She has had back trouble which has been cured
by a spinal fusion, her doctor reporting her as being.
"capable of doing everything but the heaviest of lifting."
(R61, Def. Ex. 1, admitted by joint stipulation of the parties, letter .June 17, 1969, page 2). She testified that she
was not under medical care for her back, (R60, P48, L916), and that it gives her trouble only when her posture is
poor. She then gets "splints." (R60, P55, L2-7). She is
nervous, but this condition long preceded the decree of
4
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divorce. She has been under the care of Dr. Diumenti,
Bom1tiful, Utah, since 1953 or 1954, seeing him every
three to four months, and receiving nerve medications for
the greater part of the entire period. (R60, P65, L2-P66,
L3). As she has held jobs before and after the divorce,
while seeing Dr. Diumenti and taking nerve pills, and
never been fired, her basic nervous condition seems not
disabling. Plaintiff's own witness, Mrs. Cote, testified
that plaintiff has always been emotonal. (R60, P7 4, L1619). Defendant testified that to his observation plaintiff
had returned to her normal condition, that is her ordinary
couclition prior to the break up of the marriage and her
hospitalization. (R60, P33, L5-26; P34, L4-24; P35, LI01:3). Plaintiff's hospitalization and psychiatric treatment
luffe terminated. (R60, P63, LIS-30).
Notwithstanding this, in the three and one-half years
hetween entry of the decree of divorce and the petition
for modification, and the 15 months between the spinal
fnsion and the petition for modification, plaintiff had
only worked a couple of months total at three different
johs and had made only" several" other job applications.
(RGO, P50, L19-29).
Since her back fusion she has done such things as
~~hovel snow, (R60, P41, L29-P43, LI; P50, L7-8), done
h0r household chores, (RGO, P62, L12-13), gone on pine
nut picking trips, (R60, P16, L21-Pl7, L 24; P 61, L182G), and picked fruit from trees, (R60, P16, L13-20).
The jobs she had since the divorce involved very
lH'HV,\' manual labor. She \Yas the sole waitress, cook and
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janitrcss on a restaurant night shift, (R60, P19, L3-14,
grape picker, (R60, P62, L30-P63, Ll), and shipping clerk
taking heavy boxes from a conveyor belt, (R60, P59, L18P60, L6). She testified that these jobs were too strenuous. The fact she would consider them and do them at all
must indicate a basic physical soundness. She said that
she terminated all of these employments due either to
pneumonia or back trouble, all conditions from which she
had since recovered. ( R60, P67, L6-26).
She told a friend that she quit her two mouth job as
a \vaitress because if defendant found out, he might want
to reduce the alimony. (R60, P19, L15-P20, L3). During
the same period defendant remained steadily employed
at Kennecott Copper where he has worked for 21 years.
(R60, P26, L5-10). His gross earnings at the time the
Decree of Divorce was entered were $8,217.68 per year.
(R60, P26, L12-16). In 1969 they were $8,712.00 per year,
but his net was decreased from 1965 due to taxes. (R60,
P27, L3-8, L14-20). His present monthly net income is
$470.00 to $490.00. (R60, P27, L9-10). Defendant has
remarried during the interim period to a woman with
four children who receives only partial support from
their father. (R60, P37, L3-24). As a matter of human
necessity he provides in part for these children and his
present wife. He testified that he has been unable to get
out of debt due to the alimony requirement, the nine
month Kennecott strike in 1967, and the increased cost
of living. (R60, P30, Lll-15, L24, P31, IA). The monthly
payments on the previous obligations, which he has paid,
has also kept him indebted, acquiring one debt as he re-
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tires another. (R61, Def. Ex. 2). Without his remarriage,
he would still be in financial cliff iculty. ( R60, P35, L1727). Deducting plaintiff's $250.00 per month alimony and
the present $15.00 additional clef endant pays on arrearages, leaves defendant a net of $205.00 to $225.00 a month.
From this he must pay the $3,600.00 in outstanding obligations of the parties ancl their succeeding debts, make
good the disastrous financial effects of the Kennecott
strike, and provide in part for his present wife and her
children.
Since the divorce, plaintiff has acquired an apartment in the basement of the home. She pays $50.00 a
month for its building cost and rents it for $70.00 per
month. (R60, P54, L6-14). She pays $86.00 monthly on
the first mortgage on the home, and will have it paid off
in 1972. (R60, P57, Lll-14). By 1972, the costs of building the basement apartment will also be paid off. The
rPsult will be that when plaintiff is 60, she will own the
home clear, and have an income producing apartment.
It should be noted that defendant's attorney, Samuel
King, is not related to either party.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CHANGING FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSITION ON THE PETITION TO REDUCE ALI1\[0NY, AND ITS DENIAL OF SUCH PETITION IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE WEIGHT
ORDINARILY GIVEN TO THE RULINGS
OF A TRIAL COURT.

7
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At the conclusion of the .July 11, 1969, hearing, the
court called counsel into chambers, and said it would
give defendant a $50.00 per month alimony reduction,
and further reductions based on plaintiff's earnings, and
required her to make good faith efforts to find and hold
employment. (R76, letter dated .July 21, 1969, and R69).
Plaintiff's attorney prepared the order. (R69). The
order was a<lverse to plaintiff's position. Her attorney
would not have prepared it in that form, unless he clearly
understood it to be the order of the court. The trial court
failed to sign the order to otherwise act. After a passage
of time, defendant's counsel petitioned the court to sign
the order, (R54-56), but suggested that it be modified.
Defendant's proposal, to modify the order, was that illstead of reducing alimony based on plaintiff's work record that the court find a specific sum as representative
of plaintiff's potential earnings and use that figure to
reduce the defendant's obligations.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to have the
order signed, preferably with modifications, the trial
judge changed his position, an<l offered defendant a flat
$50.00 per month reduction, on risk of having relief denied him altogether. This ·was on September 9, 1969.
(R69, Pl-3). The relief offered was not adequate so defen<lant refused the court's offer, and asked for the ruling originally announced by the court. The court then
denied any relief. Plaintiff's counsel agreed, during this
argument, that the order he originally submitted was the
order the court first stated, (R67, P2, Ll0-28). The court
denied this and said it was onl~T a proposal of settlement
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by the court if the parties agreed to it and was not an
order at all. (R67, P2, Ll9-22).
The trial court has been inconsistent in three ways.
If it originally found, as it eventually ruled, that there
was no change of circumstances, why did it do the following? First, it put plaintiff in the position of facing a
flat $50.00 per month alimony reduction, together with
additional reductions based on her work. If there were
no change of circumstances, why should the court require
plaintiff to negotiate her position on alimony? Second,
the original alimony was based on plaintiff's inability to
work and the court ultimately found no change of circumstances. If this means the court found she was unemployable, why did it propose a stipulation for modification
based on her earnings and require her to go to work"?
Third, if there was no change of circumstances, why did
the court offer defendant at the September 1969 hearing
a $.50.00 reduction.
The Findings of Fact were not signed by the court
until ~larch 20, 1970. Paragraph II of the Findings
states, "That the plaintiff is suffering with back problems after a spinal fusion operation on March 31, 1968,
rendering plaintiff unable to bend or stoop to do things;
further her back condition has rendered her unable to
secure employment or hold employment. The plaintiff
has been seeing Dr. Diumenti and Dr. Hess in connection
with her physical and nervous condition." (R62-63).
This is in flat error of fact. Plaintiff's doctor reported
plaintiff able to be "capable of doing all but the heaviest
lifting." (R61, Def. Ex. 1, letter .June 17, 1969, page 2).
9
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Plaintiff testified that her back trouble was not disabling,
that she was no longer under medical care for it, (R60,
P48, L9-16), and her only major hack complaint is
"splints" when her posture is poor. (R60, P55, L2-7).
There is no issue raised as to the integrity of the
trial court, but its present, final, ruling simply fails to
relate to its earlier actions. \Vhen the trial court heard
the evidence, it proposed relief. Six months later, 'vhen
pressed for a specific ruling, it denied relief. No evidence
had been introduced in the interim to defendant's knowledge. Under these circumstances, the weight usually
given to the findings of a trial court should not be given
here. The appellate court should consider the matter on
its merits. Hampton v. Ha nipton, 86 U. 570, 47 P.2cl 419;
53 Am. J ur., Trials, §1140, pp. 794-795.
1

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT RELIEF ON ALIMONY
BECAUSE THERE WERE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING SUCH RELIEF.
30-3-5 UCA, 1953, as amended, gives the court power
to modify a Decree of Divorce for the support and maintenance of the parties as shall be reasonab1e and necessary. 30-3-9, dealing with a guilty party forfeiting all
rights has been repealed.
The trial court denied reduction or termination of
alimo11y to defendant on the ground that lH' fail rel to show
a change of circumstancrs. The court cnccl.
10
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There were two basic changes of circumstances. The
defendant had been unable to work his way out of debt
because the wife got everything in the divorce decree and
he got the debts. (R61, Def. Ex. 2). He would have been
unable in his opinion to survive adequately financially
even if he had not remarried. (R60, P35, L17-27). His
remarriage presented him 'With four stepchildren being
inadequately provided for by their natural father. (R60,
P37, L3-24). His net income was reduced since the decree
although his gross was increased by $600.00. (R60, P26,
L16-26, P27, L3-20). The remarriage and subsequent
obligations of an ex-husband are not a primary factor in
any given case. It is acknowledged that he must provide
for the first relationship first. However, it is a human
factor and if it can be recognized without doing great
harm to the other party, it should be given appropriate
weight.
The second and major error of the trial court was in
finding that the plaintiff's circumstances had not
changed. They were changed.
\Vhen the divorce was granted, plaintiff was given
alimony because she was hospitalized for psychiatric
r<>asons. Since then she has terminated her hospitalization, psychiatric treatment and had her back repaired,
and was capable of working several jobs, which were
terminated only by her quitting. In 1969 she was "capable of doing anything except the heaviest of lifting."
(R61, Def. Ex. 1, letter June 17, 1969, page 2).
11
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If plaintiff chose to obtain employment, the economic
problems between the parties would be resolved between
the parties. She testified that her back at the present
time gave her no trouble except for splints when her posture was poor. She 1" not im<ler medical care for her
hack. (R60, P48, L9-16; P55, L2-7). She did not deny
the letter of her attending physician, Dr. Hess, which
indicated she could do any work except that involving the
heaviest lifting. (R61, Ex. 1). She has held jobs both
before and after the decree of divorce. She has never been
fired from a job and has gotten along with her co-employees. (RGO, PG2, L19-P63, L4). She testified that she was
going to work and reduce alimony, but in view of her
only maki11g '' sc•\·rral'' efforts to find employment, (R60,
P30, L19-29), the genuinem•ss of her efforts is obYiously
i10t great.

In view of the fact that this marriage was plaintiff's
third marriage, and she had no children by it, and entered
into it at the age of 37 and exited from it at the age of
33, it "·oulcl apprar that her right to alimony was based
almost entirely on her inability to work or care for herself at all due to hospitalization "·hen the diYorce was
heard. At the time the petition for modification was
heard, she was capable of working arn1 testified that slH'
was looking for work, although her efforts ~were so intermit te11t that i11 15 months since the spinal fusion \Yhich
has cured her health condition, she had only made "several" job applications. (R60, P50, L19-29). Plaintiff
also had a ne>1Tous eondition, hut she, her O\Yll witne~s.
(RGO, P7±, Ll6-17), and defendant, (RGO, P:13, L3-2G:
12
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P34, IA-24, P33, Ll0-13), all testified that she ha<l been
nervous as a matter of character both before and after
the decree of divorce, and that this had never cost her
employment either before or after the divorce. Defendant
provided for plaintiff throughout their marriage, although she worked, at her choosing, during the marriage.
(R60, P34, L25-P35, L3; P66, L6-9). The facts and equities preponderate for defendant. He gave plaintiff the
entire net estate of the parties at the time of the decree
of divorce. This included a home equity of $12,000.00 to
$14,000.00 depending on plaintiff's or defendant's figures, an uncontroverted, $3,540.00 on personal property
and her personal effects. From the marriage the defendant took only a 1964 pickup truck which was encumbered,
along with other obligations, in the sum of $3,617.42, all
of which defendant has paid. Also since the decree of
divorce through July 5, 1969, he has paid plaintiff $10,025.00 in alimony. (R61, Def. Ex. 2; R60, P29, L26-29).
In view of the established facts that plaintiff got the
entire net property of the parties at the time of the divorce, that she was unemployable at the time of divorce,
(Rl3, f[9), but employable at the time of the petition to
modify, (R61, Def. Ex. 1), and that defendant had been
in debt continually since entry of the decree of divorce
because his net earnings have decreased while his obligations have increased due to cost of living, debts of the
first marriage and his remarriage, (R60, P30, Lll-15,
L24-P31, L4), the question then arises, as the basic question in the case, as to whether or not an ability of selfsupport acquired by a wife which was not present at the

13
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time she obtained a decree of divorce, is grounds for a
change in the amount of alimony that she is to receive.
No Utah case tests this point specifically although
many state the general rule that property allocation and
alimony must conform to the needs and abilities of the
parties.
At common law, the rule favored plaintiff. Alimony
was a permanent award to the 'vife representing the duty
of the husband, once married, to ever after provide for
his wife.
Now, alimony has had some change of character due
to the general emancipation and employment of women.
Some authorities hold to the common law rule, but juris
by juris the rule is being changed. The change is not basic, in that equity is still done as best possible. It is
simply that a divorced woman, who can work, should
work if the alimony is burdensome to the husband. After
all, a wife docs have a choice of remedies. If she desires
the protection and status afforded her by the common
law, she can apply for separate maintenance. Thereby,
she keeps her status as a married "'oman and the husband
retains the obligation of her support.
The rule is best stated in Lockhart 1'. Lockhart, 259
P.385, C\Vash. 1927), "In this state, ·where the marital
relation is disturbed by the fault of the husband, the wife
has a choice of remedies, she may apply for separate
maintenance, or she may apply for an absolute divorce.
In the former instance, it is but just that she should have

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a separate share of her husband's earnings so long as he
continues in his objectionable conduct. But there is in
<>very instance ·what the law always favors, the hope of a
reconciliation and a resumption of the marital relation.
But where the wife applies for and obtains an absolute
divorce, this hope is gone, and there is but little more for
the court to consider than a just division of the common
property. It is not the policy of the law, nor is it either
just or equitable, that a divorced wife be given a perpetual lien upon her divorced husband's future earnings.
She has chosen to go her own way, abandon all the obligations she assumed by her marital vows, and it is only
under the most unusual circumstances that she can rightfully call upon him to continuously contribute to her support.'' In that case alimony was burdensome on the husband and the wife was making no effort to work although
able to do so. The trial court granted the husband a
reduction from $150.00 a month to $100.00 per month.
The appellate court reduced the alimony in stages for
one year and then terminated it entirely.
In the case now before the court, it would be appropriate for defendant to pay $100.00 per month to plaintiff
until.January 1, 1973, and alimony should then terminate
entirely as at that point plaintiff will have a home clear
of obligations and an income producing apartment also
clear of obligations in her basement. She will then be
only 60 years of age. Should her health collapse, she
could of course petition the court for an increase in the
alimony.
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llampton 1 Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47 P2d 419, is the
closest Utah casC'. There an ex-,Yife with a minor child
was not employed. The defendant husband had r0-married and had an additional child. His income was reduced
from $2,100.00 per ~·ear to $1,500.00 per year. The trial
court, on the husband's petition for modification, reduced
his alimony from $60.00 p0r month to $54.00 pN month.
Tlw Suprem0 Court further reduced it to $45.00 per
m011th, drawing a line between the absolute needs of the
wife arnl child and the present needs of the husband. Implicit in the judgment, in view of the reduction, is that the
wifo was rrquired to help herself and not just take a free
ri< h•.
1

•

Also in support ar0 Lanborn r. Lanborn, 251 J:>. 943,
(Cal. 1926), a11d Longs r. Langs, 9 N.\V.2d 705, (S.D.
194~). llf ark r. Mark, 80 N.\V.2d 621, (J\Iinn. 1957), (holding sprcifically that later acquired ability of a wife to
work is a changed circumstance jm;tifying modification),
and Learitt r. Leavitt, 399 P.2d 33, (Cal. 1965), (also
holding that ability to work, later acquired, is substantial
change of circumsta11c0s justifying modification.)
Another factor the court should consider is that thr
original decree of divorce, although consented to by the
husband, was so grossly disproportionate in its distrilmtion of assets a11d obligations, that it is proper for the
court to attempt, within reasonable hounds, to rectify, or
at lt>ast consider, that disposition in its suhsequent rnli11g::-;. A11derso11 r. A11rlerso11, 104 U. 104, 138 P. 252; Foreman r. Forema11, 111 U. 72, 176 P.2<1144; L111ulgrce11 r.

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lundgreen, 112 U. 31, 184 P.2d 670, (ability to earn is a
factor to be co11sidered); TV ooley v. Wooley, 113 U. 391,
195 P.2d 743.

Defendant respectfully submits that the ruling of the
trial judge on his motion for modification was erroneous,
that it was not supported by the evidence, contrary to
equity, and imposes an impossible burden upon him, and
no burden upon plaintiff. Accordingly he requests that
his alimony be reduced forthwith to $100.00 per month,
~mch alimony to terminate entirely January 1, 1973.
Respectfuly submitted,
SAMUEL KING
King, Craft & Bullen
.Attorneys for Defenda;nt.A ppelam.t
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

